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A MONETARY TOOL TOWARD ECONOMIC COMPLEMENTARITY 
 
 
The international financial crisis has sparked debates on possible reforms and 
new mechanisms needed in the International Financial Architecture (IFA) in order to 
deter the consequences of this crisis and prevent future ones. The G20 has emerged as 
a  consultation  mechanism  in  which  northern  powers  seek  support  from  the  most 
prominent emerging economies of „the South‟ in order to pursue policy articulation. 
The G20 has in turn created a new institution, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), at 
the same time as it has strengthened the position of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF).  Rather  than  focusing  on  rebuilding  the  IFA,  or  reforming  the  structure  of 
existing mechanisms, discussions amongst the G20 have placed emphasis on setting 
so-called  prudential  standards  in  order  to  better  articulate  policy  concerning  the 
world‟s largest economies. 
Nonetheless,  criticism  has  emerged  with  respect  to  the  legitimacy  of  this 
forum  and  its  willingness  to  attend  to  structural  problems  in  the  global  financial 
system. As a result of the weakness of the new regulations, an important development 
in this reform debate has been the fragmentation of emerging proposals into regional 
and national components (Helleiner, 2010; Woods, 2010). Countries such as China 
and Russia have voiced their discomfort with the position of the dollar as a reserve 
currency in the global economy, while most emerging powers participating in G20 
negotiations have expressed fewer concerns with many of the pro-market initiatives 
that seem to benefit them in the short run. Even when the limitations of the current 
global reforms debate are pointed out by critical analysts, regional initiatives tend to 
be  overshadowed.  The  South  American  region  is  no  exception  and  has  been 
promoting the emergence of new mechanisms at the multilateral level which could 
reorganize the regional financial architecture. 
Efforts to question the hegemony of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) 
in the region date from the attempt to create the Banco del Sur in February 2007. This 
was  the  product  of  initial  conversations  between  presidents  Hugo  Chávez  of Venezuela and Néstor Kirchner of Argentina. Ecuador, Bolivia, Uruguay, Brazil and 
Paraguay  formally  joined  the  initiative  soon  afterwards.  Upon  first  mention  in 
presidential meetings, the Banco del Sur gained legitimacy as a possible replacement 
for the Bretton Woods institutions and their satellites in the region. 
Precisely because of the varying intentions and premises that drove different 
governments  into  this  initiative,  negotiations  on  creating  the  Bank  generated 
important  debates  as  to  what  kind  of  new  financial  architecture  should  be  built. 
Venezuela and Ecuador proposed the creation of various institutions to progressively 
supersede the presence of Bretton Woods multilaterals in the region. In the midst of 
these talks, the Ecuadorian government proposed the creation of a New Financial 
Architecture (NFA), based on a development bank, a regional reserves fund (Fondo 
del Sur) and a monetary union that could eventually evolve into a common currency. 
The idea was supported by critical scholars in the region who helped shape it into a 
viable proposal to South American governments (Ugarteche, 2008a). 
Political support for the idea of an NFA was received from South American 
governments in the Quito Initiative, approved in May 2007 as part of the Banco del 
Sur  negotiations  (Marshall  and  Rochon,  2009;  Ugarteche,  2008a).  It  was  finally 
agreed that the Banco del Sur would be a development bank. However, because of a 
delay in the Bank‟s creation and capitalization, the Bolivarian Alliance pushed for the 
creation of the Banco del ALBA in 2008, also as a development bank. That same 
year, Ecuador became a full member of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our 
Americas  – Peoples‟ Trade Agreement (ALBA-PTA) and, at the end of the  year, 
SUCRE (Sistema Unificado de Compensación Regional de Pagos – Unified Regional 
Clearing System) was approved as the common currency among its associates (with 
the exception of the Caribbean island nations). 
In October 2009, the SUCRE Constitutive Treaty was signed during the 7
th 
Presidential Summit of the ALBA-PTA by the presidents of Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, 
Honduras (which then signed out of the agreement as a result of a de facto regime 
imposed  in  2009),  Nicaragua  and  Venezuela,  and  was  formally  constituted  in 
February,  2010.  The  proposal  originally  represented  an  attempt  to  progressively 
reduce  dependency  of  the  ALBA-PTA  member  states  on  the  US  dollar  in  intra-
regional  trade.  This  clearing  mechanism,  established  by  the  ALBA-PTA  member 
states in response to the global capitalist crisis, was also a key tool for encouraging 
further economic integration in this regional alliance via its attempt to build on new productive  relations  between  rather  disconnected  economies,  in  accordance  with 
ALBA‟s  principles  of  cooperation,  solidarity,  reciprocity  and  respect  for  national 
sovereignty. 
SUCRE is composed of a Regional Monetary Council (or CMR, its Spanish 
acronym),  a  common  unit  of  account  called  the  „sucre‟  (lowercase),  a  Central 
Clearing Compensation Chamber and a Regional Trade and Reserves Convergence 
Fund (Acuerdo Marco, 2009). Based on John Maynard Keynes’ original ideas on the 
international monetary system, SUCRE is intended to provide stability to the region’s 
monetary  system  as  well  as  strengthen  its  integration  capacity  and  productive 
complementarity. However, it currently faces the challenge of increasing the export 
base  of  economies  which  have  considerably  low  diversification  and  almost 
nonexistent physical integration. 
This paper seeks to understand the theoretical backgrounds that underlie the 
System,  while  raising  the  main  issues  the  region  faces  with  respect  to  trade  and 
external dependency. The argument will unfold as follows: first, we discuss the main 
issues  that  need  to  be  tackled  regarding  regional  integration  in  the  midst  of  this 
initiative; second, we give a theoretical account of Keynes’ proposals as they relate to 
SUCRE; we then summarize details of the operation of the mechanism; and finally we 
draw some perspectives for SUCRE in its regional environment for the discussion on 
economic integration. 
 
SUCRE: facing issues of trade, dependency and productive diversification 
 
SUCRE was launched in a universe of regional trade worth 70 billion dollars 
with the inclusion of the oil exchange, or slightly over 10 billion dollars excluding oil 
and minerals. This constitutes about 5% of the trade between the entire region and the 
rest  of  the  world  (ALBA-PTA,  2010).  If  the  trade  in  hydrocarbons  is  included, 
Venezuela  is  clearly  the  main  partner  in  the  region,  accounting  for  over  70%  of 
exports in 2009, equivalent to over 50 billion US dollars (ALBA-PTA, 2010; see 
Chart N° 1). If oil and minerals are not included, Ecuador becomes the region‟s main 
trading partner, with 38% of exports, followed by Cuba and Venezuela with 25% and 





Although  the  ALBA-PTA  agreements  have  helped  generate  trade  among 
members (between 2003 and 2008, trade grew fivefold with respect to the previous decade), commerce in the region is still rather marginal. For instance, both in terms of 
volume and value, Venezuela‟s main trading partners in the South American region 
continue to be Colombia, Brazil and Argentina. Nonetheless, between 2000 and 2006, 
the volume of trade between Venezuela and Cuba increased significantly, from 12 
million US dollars in 2000 to 2 billion in 2006 (ECLAC, 2010). Under the guiding 
principles of ALBA, bilateral trade between Cuba and Venezuela has been enhanced, 
which already implies compensated payment mechanisms. This is the case for most 
oil exchanges, which have either been financed over a period of 20 years under the 
Petrocaribe  Agreement  or  compensated  by  medical  and  other  professional  and 
technical support provided to the Venezuelan government by the Cuban state. 
According to López (2008), Latin America maintains a radically biased trade 
pattern when compared to the rest of the world, continuing its “specialization in raw 
materials in production and exports with a limited manufactured industry”. This is 
worth  noting,  because  previous  economic  research  on  South  American  monetary 
integration  has  concentrated  on  assessing  the  possibility  of  fulfilling  Mundell‟s 
Optimum Currencies Areas theory, rather than first creating feasible mechanisms for 
actually building productive and financial complementarities (López, 2008; Sevares, 
2007).  For  these  authors,  it  is  essential  that  a  way  to  endorse  macroeconomic 
coordination  and  monetary  integration  in  the  region  be  previously  rooted  in 
productive and technological complementarities. 
  The role of Latin America and the Caribbean with respect to integration with 
the rest of the world has clearly been established as that of commodity provider to the 
industrial  center.  As  noted  by  Marini,  this  is  at  the  root  of  power  asymmetries 
between  formally  independent  nations,  as  productive  relations  are  “modified  or 
recreated in order to ensure the amplified production of dependency” (Marini, 2007: 
102). As a result, instead of forming the basis of national economies, the “center” of 
production  linkages  is  built  from  industrialized  countries.  Thus,  “Latin  American 
production  does  not  depend  on  its  internal  consumption  capacity  for  its  own 
realization”  (op.cit.  :  121).  The  internal  demands  of  the  „working  classes‟  are 
basically subordinated to the transfer of their surplus value to the world economy, 
while increasing profits in the upper classes contribute to creating expectations that 
are not satisfied with domestic production but with imports from the core instead. The 
legacy of dependency throughout the region has significant relevance in the economic 
relationship between the region and the more industrialized north. Despite  integrationist  rhetoric  from  governments  and  social  actors  since 
independence  was  achieved,  Latin  American  and  Caribbean  countries  have  been 
economically structured to supply raw materials to industrial centers, particularly to 
the US. This has led to the dramatic phenomenon of commoditization, where most 
countries‟ exports are largely primary products. The cases of Venezuela and Ecuador 
are the most pervasive; over 90% of their exports are raw materials (mainly minerals 
and hydrocarbons) (ECLAC, 2010). These economic relationships intensified during 
the years of economic boom at the beginning of the present century, mostly due to 
rising commodity prices and skyrocketing growth and consumption in China. Even 
though the Prebisch-Singer premise on the tendency of declining terms of trade is 
currently  being  empirically  questioned,  the  general  issue  of  Latin  American  and 
Caribbean  dependency  on  reproducing  the  northern-industrial  economies  of  the 
capitalist system still seems valid. The growth of China has not only allowed regional 
trade to be boosted, and with it access to foreign currency, it has also raised the old 
issues of technical and productive dependency. 
The question here is not so much how to “de-link” from the dynamics of the 
globalized  economy,  but  rather  how  to  build  new  linkages  between  southern 
productive sectors, which are statist in nature, from private business and/or grassroots, 
communal  or  cooperative  enterprises.  This  is  the  purpose  of  setting  up  possible 
mechanisms  to  re-direct  some of the primary  and semi-manufactured trade  within 
Latin  America and the  Caribbean in  order to  establish  niches  of  “autochthonous” 
industry. In this respect, according to SUCRE advocates, Venezuelan petrochemicals 
and fertilizers, semi-processed Nicaraguan woods and Bolivian textiles, among many 
other  examples,  may  offer  opportunities  for  new  regional  chains  of  production. 
Indeed, SUCRE has explicitly not focused on oil and hydrocarbons exchanges, which 
represent nearly 80% of regional trade. This shows the intention to transform the 
terms of intraregional trade (Cerezal et al., forthcoming). 
Last, but not least, we should take into account that SUCRE also functions 
alongside other clearing mechanisms in the economic region, such as the Asociación 
Latinoamericana  de  Integración  (ALADI)  and  other  payment  mechanisms  in  the 
Caribbean  under  the  Caribbean  Community  and  Common  Market  (CARICOM). 
Looking beyond the question of SUCRE‟s technical competitiveness towards other 
payment  systems  initiatives,  the  fact  that  it  draws  deep  inspiration  from  certain 
principles  of  the  Keynes  Plan  makes  it  appear  to  be  a  genuine  complementary initiative that should be definitively affirmed as an innovative pretext for putting the 
focus back on the productive roots of trade, in short, on real economy. 
 
The Keynes Plan and its application to an alternative monetary system 
 
  As  we  noted  above,  monetary  integration  in  the  region  has  usually  been 
analyzed through the lens of Mundell‟s Optimum Currency Areas theory, which states 
that  it  is  only  when  trade  increases  and  productive  cycles  become  more 
interconnected and diversified that monetary union and macroeconomic coordination 
appear as feasible steps towards facilitating integration procedures and reducing trade 
costs  (López,  2008;  Sevares,  2007).  Indeed,  Peruvian  economist  Oscar  Ugarteche 
(2008b)  proposed  the  creation  of  a  monetary  union  for  South  America  under  the 
principles of Mundell‟s Optimum Currency Area theory, despite the creation of the 
Banco del Sur. His research showed that after weighing each economy, based on its 
GDP and trade (both intra- and extra- regional), there was relative stability in the 
regional currency basket when compared to the euro and the dollar. However, this 
idea has been criticized in arguments based on the lack of trade among associates, 
strong asymmetries between the region‟s economies and their scarce diversification 
(Mussachio, 2008). 
  Far  from  Mundell‟s  approach,  inspiration  for  SUCRE  comes  from  the  so-
called Keynes Plan, the proposal presented by the English economist of that name at 
the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944. In an attempt to reshape the international 
commercial and monetary system, Keynes proposed a set of measures and institutions 
aimed at reducing the economic fluctuations that had “destroyed the security of our 
way of life and damaged international peace” (Keynes, 1943: 472). The proposal was 
designed to lay the groundwork for a trade, monetary and financial system that would 
tend to balance countries‟ current accounts, at the same time limiting capital flows 
only to those related to trade and direct investment. According to Keynes, in order to 
do this the system should be based on the existence of the following elements: 
- A non-metallic international currency in order to prevent the emergence of 
key currencies. 
-  A  sufficient  amount  of  this  international  currency  to  meet  liquidity 
requirements arising from international trade flows. The total amount of the currency  could  be  expanded  and  contracted  to  control  deflationary  or 
inflationary pressures. 
- A pre-established method for determining the exchange rates between each 
of the national currencies. 
- An internal mechanism to stabilize the international financial and trading 
system, putting pressure on any country whose balance of payments became 
too far above or below the equilibrium level. 
- A central institution to regulate the system and give technical support to 
other institutions in charge of the planning and regulation of global economic 
activity. 
In Keynes‟ proposal these elements led to a monetary union which had two 
main pillars: first, an „International Clearing Union‟ (ICU), and second, the creation 
of an international bank currency called the „bancor‟. This currency, whose value 
would  be  set  in  terms  of  gold,  would  be  used  for  international  trade  operations, 
although national currencies would continue to be used within each economy. Each 
country  would  have  an  account  with  the  Clearing  Union,  which  would  score  all 
transactions, both for imports and exports. Every central bank would pay its overall 
balances from international trade, whether as debtors or creditors, in bancors. 
Keynes‟ aim was to generalize "the essential principle of banking" at the level 
of international balances: the equality required in a closed financial system between 
credits and debits. This would make it impossible to withdraw funds from the system, 
thereby avoiding difficulties in financing deficit countries. Therefore, any transfer of 
funds would necessarily be to the clearing account of another member of the system. 
In  fact,  any  country  could  make  payments  in  advance  to  another  member  of  the 
system,  ensuring  that  the  returns  generated  would  remain  within  the  system. 
However, as Keynes stated, the ICU would not be an institution for long term lending, 
which could only take place through other international institutions similar in nature 
to current development banks. 
At the same time, Keynes established that one of the core functions of the 
International  Clearing  Union  was  to  "discourage  creditor  countries  from  leaving 
unused large liquid balances which ought to be devoted to some positive purpose" 
(op.cit.:  473).  According  to  this  English  economist,  “excessive  credit  balances 
necessarily create decisive debt balances for some other party” (Ibid.). Underlying 
this statement was the idea that both debtor and creditor countries were guilty of international  financial  imbalances.  If  this  idea  had  been  accepted  by  international 
postwar institutions, it would have involved a radically different approach towards 
dealing with indebted economies. 
Keynes developed the two previous points in a series of conditions to be met 
for implementing the system: 
- First, while it was the member states that reached agreement on the initial 
values of their currencies in terms of the bancor, the value of this in terms of 
gold would be set by the Steering Committee of the ICU. 
- Once the currency values had been set, each country would be required to 
allocate a quota of bancors to determine its ability to borrow from its account 
at the Clearing Union. Every country would have to accept the payment of 
foreign currency loans owed to them in the new international currency. 
- To promote the maintenance of a balanced balance sheet, Keynes proposed 
establishing  a 1% fee, taxing the balance of debtors and  creditors of  each 
country below or above a quarter of its quota. 
- The Executive Committee would also have to limit the excess allowed over 
the quota, possibly imposing measures on the countries (both in trade policy 
and  as  monetary  and  financial  measures)  to  reduce  that  excess,  whether  a 
deficit or a surplus. 
- Finally, while it would be possible to pay gold to the Union to obtain credit 
in  bancors,  countries  could  not  demand  it  in  return,  i.e.,  gold  would  be 
convertible only in one direction (the second great principle that guided the 
proposal). 
Thus, in addition to allowing the money supply to be adapted to the real needs 
of liquidity, the system would prevent the emergence of a key currency. What is 
more, once set up, the ICU would become a multilateral clearing system of trade 
balances between different economies. The Union would govern the settlement of 
balances between central banks, not between exporting and importing companies or 
between their respective banks. Moreover, governments could impose exchange and 
capital controls within their borders. While Keynes believed that the system did not 
necessarily require these measures to work, he thought it would help to reduce short-
term speculation and capital flight, while restoring international loans and credits “for 
legitimate purposes” (op cit.: 484). Since the current financial and economic crisis has emerged, some economists 
(see  for  example  Costabile  (2007)  and  Piffaretti  (2009))  have  raised  the  need  to 
reform the international monetary and financial system in accordance with principles 
stated by Keynes in his day. According to these principles, such reform would be the 
only way to end the inherent instability of the financial architecture that has been built 
over  the  last  three  decades.  The  Keynes  Plan  would  guide  the  creation  of  a 
multilateral  clearing  institution,  avoiding  the  shortcomings  of  a  monetary  and 
financial system based on the dollar standard. This could be achieved, inter alia, by 
imposing  the  need  for  adjustment  on  both  the  surplus  and  deficit  countries, 
eradicating the risk of economic contraction derived from focus adjustment in the 
latter. 
If application of the Keynes Plan for reforming the international monetary and 
financial  architecture  of  the  early  twenty-first  century  is  to  be  considered,  it  is 
necessary  to  take  into  account  several  basic  features  that  differentiate  the  current 
architecture from that faced by Keynes: first, the existence of a key currency, which is 
an important source of privileges for the hegemonic power; second, the disappearance 
of exchange patterns based on some kind of link with gold; and third, the exorbitant 
growth  of  short  term  international  financial-monetary  exchanges,  i.e.,  for  purely 
speculative reasons. 
  The  first  of  these  characteristics  underscores  the  need  to  reform  the 
international  monetary  system  by  creating  an  international  currency  and  a 
supranational institution in charge of regulating the money supply for the benefit of 
all  countries,  thus  preventing  seigniorage.  The  second  feature  implies  that  the 
principle of convertibility in one direction that Keynes proposed for gold, should be 
used  with  international  currencies,  especially  the  dollar,  to  allow  for  the  gradual 
departure of central bank reserves and their replacement with the new supranational 
currency-credit. The final characteristic outlined involves the need to link the creation 
of  the  monetary  system  to  controlling  speculative  financial  flows  through  the 
institution of exchange controls and capital movement, which is what Keynes had in 
mind. 
  If  the  international  monetary  and  financial  system  is  to  be  re-built  on  an 
alternative basis, these considerations should be implemented via a series of general 
measures: 
- The establishment of a supranational currency (already mentioned). -  The  creation  of  a  supranational  institution  in  charge  of  the  system  (also 
mentioned). 
- The establishment of an international clearing union for the receivables and 
payment obligations of each country's international trade balance. This would 
reduce the financial needs they all present at the end of a given time period. 
- The setting up of a system of fixed exchange rates between the supranational 
currency  and  national  currencies,  which  would  only  be  used  for  domestic 
economic relations. 
- The formation of a mechanism for reviewing exchange rates when deficits 
and limits are exceeded. 
- The implementation of a mechanism for limiting the surplus and deficit of 
each  country,  subjecting  those  surpluses  and  deficits  to  a  fixed  rate  and 
stimulating  reinvestment  of  the  initial  funds  by  the  creation  of  a  genuine 
development bank. 
- The regulation of exchange transactions and international capital movements 
in order to reduce them to those directly linked to trade transactions and direct 
investment. 
  These measures could also be applied to the creation of a regional monetary 
integration  project  based  on  the  Keynes  Plan  proposal.  In  this  case,  however,  a 
number  of  other  considerations  that  make  it  difficult  to  implement  in  a  narrower 
context should also be taken into account: First, Keynes designed his proposal mainly 
for a closed system, though he took into account the possibility that not all countries 
would be integrated into the architecture. Therefore, adaptation to the level of region 
would involve considering how it would work in an open system in which individual 
countries maintained trade, monetary and financial relations with third economies. In 
this respect, the first major difference is that the supranational currency would have to 
live alongside currencies from other countries and regions. Apart from raising the 
issue of an external convertibility system, this would be a major problem for system 
management  if  there  were  fixed  exchange  rates  within  it.  The  problem  is  further 
aggravated by the current context, in which a large majority of countries maintain 
flexible exchange rate regimes, thus increasing opportunities for triangular currency 
arbitrage. 
  In an open system, there are also obstacles to the introduction of mechanisms 
for limiting surplus and deficits in the clearing accounts. Each country would be able to use credits obtained in the system to pay any outstanding balances outside it. While 
Keynes had in mind the possibility of maintaining a "dual position" in the system 
within a particular group of countries associated with the Union (Keynes, 1943: 482), 
nonetheless,  the  sense  in  which  it  was  conceived  was  the  opposite:  regional 
integration within a worldwide clearing union. In this case, a threefold problem arises: 
that of having to secure external convertibility of the currency, that of being unable to 
force the total reinvestment of surplus balances within the system, and that of having 
to reconsider the imposition of a tariff on the part of those stocks that exceed certain 
levels. Ultimately, all this would be difficult to achieve within an open system of 
international  economic  relations.  However,  this  problem  does  not  prevent  the 
proposal from being adapted to a regional framework. 
 
Operative adjustments and their implications for overall System consistency 
 
  As we have seen, the creators of SUCRE did not expect to see an Optimum 
Currency Area in their economic zone (Cerezal et al., forthcoming). On the contrary, 
SUCRE advocates defend the goals of the mechanism as redefining the monetary and 
exchange policies that have prevented the long-term development of its associates. 
Moreover, up to now, SUCRE has implied no fiscal constraint whatsoever. 
  Agreement  on  SUCRE  was  reached  only  among  countries  belonging  to 
ALBA-PTA.  The  sucre  serves  as  the  unit  of  account  for  valuing,  registering  and 
clearing transactions held between central banks of member states in real time. It is in 
effect an electronic currency under which payments settled by the central banks are 
denominated to operate through the Central Clearing Compensation Chamber. It does 
not yet propose to become a medium of exchange for private agents or a store of 
value. The System is used only for trade operations and associated trade services, so 
any capital transference is excluded. For the time being, the creators of SUCRE have 
decided to leave capital transactions out of the mechanism because much of the flow 
of Latin American capital is intertwined with speculative activities and is generally 
connected with northern stakeholders. However, services, and even some forms of 
capital movements (i.e. remittances between nationals residing and working in other 
associate nations), are not completely ruled out for the prospective evolution of the 
mechanism.    In  a  nutshell,  in  its  initial  stages  SUCRE  was  designed  to  operate 
“administered” trade between countries, driven mainly by member states, with the 
purpose of building on trade balances that could generate new chains of production in 
the region and widen the countries‟ export base. The goal is to expand its capacity to 
include  various  productive  sectors,  especially  small  but  also  medium  and  large 
businesses, by channeling exchanges through the sucre. 
  The System is intended to save foreign currency from regional transactions, 
which will basically be settled in national currencies and accounted for in sucres. This 
gives the Central Banks more room for maneuver with foreign reserves and decreases 
vulnerability  to  US  dollar  seignioriage,  at  the  same  time  as  it  begins  to  build 
confidence in intraregional trade and allows for future industrial and complementary 
trade policies to be enhanced. 
  The presence of each national currency in the basket is defined by the formula: 
i 0, i W i N Tc =
 
 
 Where:  i N

 is the amount of national currency from the country. 
i W

 represents the relative weight of i national currency in the basket; 
 Tc0,i  is the exchange rate value from the last period considered for 
settling  payments with respect to the US dollar. 
   
  The value of the basket and the presence of national currencies is weighted by 
each country‟s GDP with respect to the rest, while intraregional trade is pondered 
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 Venezuelan‟s currency, the bolívar, will represent nearly 60% of the basket, 
followed by the Ecuadorian dollar, with 25%, the Cuban peso (CUC) and the Bolivian 
boliviano. 
In  order  to  integrate  the  pondered  national  currencies  in  the  basket,  the 
SUCRE  had  to  use  the  US  dollar  as  the  currency  pivot.  Notwithstanding  the  US 
dollar, which is part of the basket by virtue of its condition of legal tender in Ecuador, 
no other regional currency has a strength comparable to that of the German mark in 
the regional context of the ECU prior to the introduction of the Euro. This is mainly 
due  to  the  unquestionable  importance  of  the  US  dollar  in  regional  trade  and  the 
nonexistence of functional bilateral currency markets (Cerezal et al., forthcoming). 
  This lack of bilateral currency markets would prevent SUCRE associates from 
defending  the  values  of  their  currencies  or  that  of  the  sucre  in  the  midst  of  a 
speculative attack on them. This accounts for the decision to recalculate the value of 
the unit of account daily (adjusted to its market value  Tc0 ,i   Tc1,i ,  Tc2,i  and so on). 
Indeed,  if  the  path  of  the  sucre  differed  too  much  from  that  of  the  dollar,  this 
misalignment  could  open  up  exchange  rate  breaches  in  bilateral  exchange  rates 
between the dollar and the sucre, which in turn would encourage firms and nations to 
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  In any case, daily recalculation of the sucre implies neither high volatility nor 
instability, firstly, because the three main currencies in the basket are ruled by fixed 
exchange rates, and secondly, because certain mechanisms have been put in place for 
readjusting the quantities (Ni) of national currencies with respect to the sucre in case 
of sudden revaluations or devaluations. The essential intention again relies on making the  System  trustworthy  for  potential  commercial  actors.  A  parallel  international 
currency  basket  was  also  established  to  work  as  a  future  implicit  anchor  on  the 
world‟s five main reserve currencies and then progressively detach the trajectory of 
the sucre from the dollar. 
 






































Where 0 ≤ α ≤0,5 
The currencies considered in the second basket are the five currencies most used 
around the world for international reserve investment: the US dollar, euro, sterling 
pound, yen and Swiss franc. 
 
  The CMR assigns a set amount of sucres to each country every six months for 
trade  transactions  (see  Table  1  for  current  assignations),  while  each  central  bank 
provides the equivalent  sum  in  its  respective national  currency to  the  CMR.  It  is 
important to bear in mind that the assignation of sucres is based on the prospected 
trade between countries and their historical trends. 
 







Initial exchange rate: 1 SU = 1.25 USD. Current exchange rate: 1 SU = 1.2506 USD 
 
  For a six month period the exchanges and operations through the central banks 
in the respective countries would only be settled through SUCRE. Figure 1 illustrates 
how the System will operate 
 
Country   Assignation 
Bolivia  20,800,000.00 
Cuba  20,000,000.00 
Ecuador  24,800,000.00 
Nicaragua  19,200,000.00 
Venezuela  67,200,000.00 
Total  152,000.000.00 Figure 1: Example for an import of a Bolivian good by a Venezuelan Firm 
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         The Real Time Gross Settlement System ensures rapid transfers between the 
central banks and the granting of certain facilities in case of temporary overdrafts. For 
trade agents, the advantage lies in not having to go to the exchange market or to pay 
interest on their operations within SUCRE. Moreover, during each semester, deficit 
nations can „triangle‟ trade from third parties to surplus nations. Finally, the central 
banks of the deficit countries may „borrow‟ sucres from surplus partners or from the 
CMR itself. At the end of the period, the CMR will consider the multilateral positions 
of  the  countries  in  the  Central  Clearing  House  and  order  final  payments:  those 
countries with a trade surplus within the System are allowed to receive the surplus 
sum in US dollars at the end of the period, which implies that in order to settle their 
debts, countries with a trade deficit must purchase new sucres to relocate their initial 
assignation. 
  As a result, the coordination of trade policies is also encouraged. A healthy 
balance of trade amongst SUCRE members consequently increases the capacity for 
each state to save foreign currency at the end of each semester. One of the principles 
defended by ALBA agreements is to promote trade without affecting the satisfaction 
of  peoples‟  needs,  which  emphasizes  the  need  to  build  trade  and  productive 
complementarities. National trade policies will also be oriented towards stimulating 
trade within SUCRE; at the same time countries will ask the CMR to increase their 
respective  assignations  for  further  semesters.  In  short,  SUCRE  works  with  fixed 
amounts  of  emissions  (assignations)  during  each  semester,  preventing  monetary 
imbalances in the System at the same time as it adjusts its dimensions to follow the 
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Central Payment‟s Clearing House   Another  constituent  part  of  the  SUCRE  is  specifically  designed  to  help 
increase  this  interconnectedness  of  production.  The  Regional  Trade  and  Reserves 
Convergence Fund (Fondo de Reservas y Convergencia Comercial, FRCC) has been 
set up, not only as an entity to support the functioning of the Compensation Chamber 
(as  a  way  to  finance  deficits  and  possible  after-period  defaults),  but  also  as  a 
mechanism to fight trade asymmetries among member-states. The FRCC is vested 
with the responsibility of investing in productive endeavors within countries in order 
to help increase their regional export base under a financial trusteeship. It can provide 
loans in foreign and national currencies, taking into consideration the developmental 
and productive priorities in the nation concerned. It was originally constituted with 
funds from member-states and the possibility of re-investing funds from part of a 
country‟s surplus has been considered. The CMR may define a ratio limit between the 
surplus  and  the  assignation  of  sucres;  once  this  limit  is  passed,  overly  surplus 
countries must invest sucres in the FRCC, destined for the productive apparatus of 
deficit countries (see Figure 2). 
 









S:Surplus, A: Assignation, D: Deficit. For 2 to n countries, D=S,                                                          ℮ 
is a top value of the “S/A” ratio defined by the Council. In this case S/a>e so the country will invest 
this part of its surplus in the Fund (This mechanism hasn´t been activated yet). 
 
  This again links SUCRE to the ability of its members to formulate productive 
projects,  specifically  those  of  national  governments  in  association  with  their 
respective  trade  agents.  The  main  condition  for  financing  is  initially  to  generate 
export  offer  in  the  SUCRE  area,  opening  up  a  range  of  possibilities,  from  the 
S 
A 
Surplus payed by the Council (USD or EUR) 
USD or  
SUCRE assignations 
within the P period 
Deficit cancelled to 
the Council (USD or 
EUR) 
Surplus invested in  FRCC 
D 
℮ 
Deficit  positions  Surplus positions   financing of productive structures to storage and trade facilities. Opportunities are 
given  to  small  and  medium  firms,  which  could  hold  out  the  promise  for  a  new 
configuration of regional trade. Ecuador, for instance, openly plans to link SUCRE 
with local and communal currencies and trade systems. In order to strengthen this 
productive financing strategy, support from the Banco del ALBA and possibly from 
the Banco del Sur is imperative. 
  Soon after the agreement was signed by member states, it was progressively 
ratified by the national parliaments and the System started to operate simultaneously. 
In the case of SUCRE, political will within state apparatus has definitely played a 
positive role in its development, particularly when compared with other emerging 
institutions  such  as  the  Banco  del  Sur.  In  2010  the  first  transaction  was  settled 
between  Cuba  and  Venezuela,  in  which  the  former  imported  rice  from  the  latter 
(Aporrea,  2010).  Months  later,  another  operation  between  Bolivia  and  Venezuela 
worth over 5 million US dollars took place (the sucre was valued at a rate of 1.25 US 
dollars). Bolivia exported 5 tons of soy oil to Venezuela, equivalent to slightly over 4 
million sucres (Sucrealba, 2010). In its first year, over 10 million US dollars were 
settled through the System. Notwithstanding this low figure, out of the more than 30 
million US dollars exchanged in the first quarter of 2011, Ecuador alone has traded 
goods through the sucre for over 17 million sucres in 9 transactions (Sucrealba, 2011). 
While it is still modest on a trade scale, the amount exchanged in 2011 could reach 
300 million sucres. Although private companies have begun to use the System, the 
great public purchasing power of Venezuela still exerts the most muscle, which may 
be  equilibrated  by  its  strong  petrochemical  potential,  from  which  Bolivian  and 
Ecuadorian agricultural systems could easily take advantage. What lies at stake is 
productive complementarity. 
  As  envisioned,  SUCRE  is  a  modest  yet  ambitious  initiative.  It  is  clearly 
growing despite facing some important challenges ahead, such as difficulties related 
to  diversification  and  interconnectedness.  Further  exchanges  between  distant  and 
relatively  less  diversified  economies  such  as  Bolivia  and  Nicaragua,  whose  trade 
pattern is minute, have yet to be seen. On the other hand, the impulse given to the 
initiative by countries like Ecuador and Venezuela provides opportunities for helping 
to create a regional “domestic market” for productive activities. However, its capacity 
to  develop  and  strengthen  together  with  other  regional  mechanisms  will  be 
fundamental in overcoming historical issues of dependency and development.  
SUCRE in the universe of integration: the need for a regional financial architecture 
and the pretext for a discussion on integration 
 
  Any attempt to advance monetary integration in a region that is rather dis-
integrated has to set productive complementarity as a central goal. The creators of 
SUCRE are aware of this and have established a series of institutional and technical 
mechanisms  to  tackle  this  imperative.  The  main  challenge  for  the  future  of  this 
mechanism is  for SUCRE to  establish  itself as  a trusted way of  enhancing trade, 
which at the moment remains insignificant. While state-owned enterprises will be the 
main protagonists of the mechanism in its initial stages, private business may help 
improve its dynamics in the future. Underlying questions remain with regard to the 
kind of development the region is willing to endorse. The role of SUCRE is in large 
part the promotion of a certain type of cooperative development rooted in solidarity 
and complementarity, rather than in competition. This may be the reason why SUCRE 
will remain modest in the quantitative sense, with the preference being for qualitative 
growth. Economic inclusion of small and medium productive and trade agents could 
be  highly  innovative  for  the  payment  system  itself,  as  well  as  for  the  whole 
perspective of the ALBA. 
  In this way, SUCRE definitely differs from the principles and assumptions of 
the Optimum Monetary Area as it uses the unit of account as a pretext to increase 
trade, rather than consolidate a common market to introduce a common currency. In 
other words, the common currency created by ALBA members will focus on serving 
production-led  economic  growth,  rather  than  the  development  of  a  single  trade 
schedule. SUCRE may not recognize the macroeconomic convergence principle of 
the Maastricht Treaty as an option for a single currency. It will be interesting to wait 
for other Latin American countries to organize their methods to increase the use of 
national  currencies  in  trade  and  financial  operations.  UNASUR  could  be  an 
appropriate universe in which to grasp the possibility of reproducing the “sucre”. 
  The capacity to boost the export base of all economies in the ALBA region is 
dependent not only on the role that the FRCC may play as part of SUCRE, but also on 
the strength of the Banco del ALBA as a development institution born out of ALBA 
principles.  In  this  case,  the  conditions  for  complementarities  have  to  go  through 
policy  considerations  coordinated  at  large  in  the  new  integration  mechanism. Needless to say, activation of the Banco del Sur is of vital importance, as it is yet 
another  regional  institution  that  may  help  the  constitution  of  a  new  financial 
architecture in the region. UNASUR is still a young institution of integration, born out 
of political intentions, and the Banco del Sur may well provide it with a base from 
which to further encourage productive chains within the region, with a larger margin 
of sovereignty for nation-states under a more democratic decision-making framework. 
  Environmental  issues  and  social  concerns  are  significant  here,  precisely 
because  of  the  central  role  that  infrastructure  projects  may  play  in  integration 
mechanisms. Physical integration in the region is still an open debate, in which the 
South  American  Regional  Infrastructure  Initiative  (IIRSA,  to  use  its  Spanish 
acronym) remains an option defended by multilateral institutions and the Brazilian 
government. Much criticism has been raised about this project because of its export-
oriented bias and the negative impact it may have on the Amazon Rainforest. Social 
movements and governments, such as those of Bolivia, have been very vocal in their 
opposition to IIRSA. 
  Other cooperation mechanisms may be enhanced in the form of reserve funds, 
enhancing  already  existing  institutions  such  as  the  Latin  American  Reserve  Fund 
(Fondo Latinoamericano de Reservas, FLAR) or even promoting the creation of new 
ones  under  the  umbrella  of  UNASUR.  SUCRE‟s  relationship  with  other  payment 
mechanisms may help increase cooperation between regional integration institutions. 
Such is the case of the Local Currency System (Sistema de Monedas Locales, SML) 
established by Brazil and Argentina, which has been used by hundreds of firms to a 
total of more than one billion US dollars (SELA, 2010, IPEA, 2011). It has mainly 
benefited  smaller  and  medium  enterprises  (in  2010  over  70%  of  transactions 
amounted to less than 50,000 US dollars). The relative success of the SML is in sharp 
contrast with the decreasing effectiveness of traditional clearing mechanisms such as 
ALADI, which attracts only 8% of the trade in its regional universe, of which the vast 
majority is made up solely of Venezuelan imports. 
  The role of the public sector represents a new perspective both in discussions 
regarding  the  payment  system  and  in  regional  alliances.  The  renewal  of  state 
responsibility  begins  with  the  way  that  SUCRE  may  inquire  for  clear  and  solid 
commercial  policies  and  some  kind  of  public  trade  administration,  formerly  (and 
currently) banned by IMF principles. The emergence of public participation plays a 
role in the new payments system (both SUCRE and SML) through which the best options for channeling regional trade are found. Constant pressure from the private 
sector to reduce transactional costs now has to be combined with new principles and 
positions affirmed by public institutions, such as the CMR, in order that the payments 
system can be understood and decisions can be made on how it could contribute to 
productive development, rather than function solely on behalf of the current trade and 
financial system (Kokkola, 2010).  
  If there is a proliferation of exchange in sucre, which would imply greater 
guarantees for the participating parties, it may well expand its operations beyond the 
ALBA-PTA. Clearly, trade policies that promote productive complementarity are key 
to advancing monetary and financial integration. The commitment by ALBA-PTA 
members to create an economic zone of shared development in 2009 is essential. Part 
of its initial work to enhance trade in the area is focused on taking an inventory of 
new economic factors that could benefit from redefined trade policies, and also on 
facilitating trade by reducing technical obstacles and making information easier to 
access for member states and commercial agents. Despite it being in its initial stages, 
this agreement is a promising tool for providing a base for sustained growth in the 
SUCRE. Another dimension could be explored through the inclusion of personal and 
services transactions, in order to narrow the gap between the System and populations 
in ALBA countries. This would require further development of capital controls so that 
neither speculation nor instability would be generated by new sucre emissions.  
  Until now, ALBA-PTA agreements have been centered on the political will of 
the leaders of participating countries, and policies have mostly been based on social 
issues  concerned  with  bringing  about  practical  solutions  to  the  pressing  problems 
affecting  the  majority  of  the  population.  Whether  their  results  endure  over  time 
depends on the capacity to create conditions for structural economic transformations 
that  can  persist  even  with  changes  in  the  leadership  of  any  given  participating 
country. Thus, the emergence of SUCRE and other structures of economic integration 
and policy cooperation should be welcomed as a sign of a substantial response to the 






Acuerdo Marco del Sistema Único de Compensación Regional de Pagos (SUCRE), 




12&FrReg=http://150.188.8.226/recursos/gaceta.asp&TiposDoc=S  [Accesed  15  September 
2010] 
 
Aporrea. Histórica primera operación comercial con el Sucre. 4 June 2010. Available 
at: http://www.aporrea.org/actualidad/n150289.html 
 
Cerezal Callizo, M., Molero Simarro, R. and Montero Soler, A., (in press). De la 
“Impertinencia” de la Alianza Bolivariana de los Pueblos Hacia la Pertinencia de otra 
integración regional. Aportes del S.U.C.R.E. Revista Semestre Económico, 1(1). 
 
Costabile, L., 2007. The Global Imbalances and the Keynes Plan. Political Economy 
Research Institute working papers, 156. 
 
Dooley, M.,  Folkerts-Landau, D. and Garber, P., 2003. An Essay on the Revived 
Bretton  Woods  System.  National  Bureau  of  Economic  Research  working  papers, 
9971. 
 
Economic  Commission  for  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean,  ECLAC,  2010. 





Kokkola. T., ed., 2010: The payment system: payments, securities and derivatives, 
and the role of the Eurosystem. Frankfurt am Main: European Central Bank. 
Helleiner, E., 2010. A Bretton Woods Moment? The 2007-08 Crisis and the Future of 
Global. International Affairs 86(3), pp.619–636. 
 
Keynes, J.M., 1943. Proposición para una Unión Internacional de Compensación. In 
Serulle Ramia, J. and Boin, J., 1984. FMI, deuda externa y crisis mundial. Madrid: 
IEPALA. 
 
López, V., 2008. Área monetaria óptima: un pretexto entre integración y desarrollo. 
Revista del Banco Central de Venezuela, XXII(1), pp.21-72. 
 
Marini, R.M., 2007. Dialéctica de la dependencia. In: R.M. Marini, 2007. América 
Latina, dependencia y globalización. Buenos Aires: CLACSO. 
 
Marshall,  W.  and  Rochon,  L.P.,  2009.  Financing  economic  development  in  Latin 
America: the Banco del Sur. Journal of Postkeynesian Economics, 32(2), pp.185-198. 
 Montero  Soler,  A.,  Cerezal  Callizo,  M.  and  Molero  Simarro,  R.,  2010.  SUCRE: 
releyendo a Keynes en el siglo XXI. América Latina en movimiento,458, pp.22-23. 
 
Mussachio,  A.,  2008.  Costos  y  beneficios  de  una  integración  monetaria  en  el 
MERCOSUR: reflexiones a la luz de la experiencia europea. CICLOS en la historia, 
la economía y la sociedad, 33/34. 
 
Piffaretti,  N.F., 2009.  Reshaping the  International  Monetary Architecture:  Lessons 
from the Keynes Plan. In Banks and Banks Systems, 4(1), pp.45-54. 
 
Rosales, A., 2010a. De la crisis asiática a la crisis inmobiliaria: Los debates actuales 
sobre  la  arquitectura  financiera  internacional”.  Problemas  del  desarrollo:  revista 
latinoamericana de economía, 41(163), pp.31-51. 
 
Rosales,  A.,  2010b.  El  Banco  del  Sur  y  el  SUCRE:  (des)Acuerdos  sobre  una 
Arquitectura  Financiera  Alternativa.  In:  Jornadas  de Economía Crítica, Zaragoza-
Spain, 15 February 2010. 
Sistema  Económico  Latinoamericano,  SELA,  2010.  Experiencias  de  Cooperación 
Monetaria y Financiera en América Latina y el Caribe. Balance Crítico y Propuestas 
de  Acción  de  Alcance  Regional.  Accesed  on  12  December,  2010.  Available  at: 
http://www.sela.org/DB/ricsela/EDOCS/SRed/2010/03/T023600003766-0-
Experiencias_de_Cooperacion_Monetaria_y__Financiera_en_ALC2.pdf 
Secretaría del ALBA-PTA, 2011. Matriz Comercial 2000-2009. Caracas. 
 
Sevares, J., 2007. Regímenes Cambiarios e Integración (Pensando en el Mercosur). 
In: A. Girón and E. Correa, eds., 2007. Del Sur hacia el Norte: economía política del 
orden económico internacional emergente. Buenos Aires: CLACSO. 
 
Sucrealba, 2010. Venezuela y Bolivia Concretaron Primera Operación Comercial por 
el  SUCRE.  Available  at:  http://www.sucrealba.org/index.php?q=content/venezuela-y-
bolivia-concretaron-primera-operaci%C3%B3n-comercial-por-el-sucre [Accesed 2 April 2 
2011] 
 
Sucrealba, 2011. “Ecuador movi￳ más de $17 Millones en Comercio a través Del 
SUCRE”.  Available  at:  http://www.sucrealba.org/index.php?q=content/ecuador-
movi%C3%B3-m%C3%A1s-de-17-millones-en-comercio-trav%C3%A9s-del-sucre 
[Accesed 4 April 2 2011] 
 
Tratado  Constitutivo  Banco  del  Sur  (23/11/09).  Gaceta  Oficial  N.  39.312  Ley 
Aprobatoria del Convenio Constitutivo del Banco del Sur. Caracas, Venezuela. 
Ugarteche,  Ó.,  2008a.  Entre  la  realidad  y  el  Sueño:  la  construcción  de  una 
arquitectura financiera sudamericana. Revista Nueva Sociedad, 217, pp.14-23.  
 
Ugarteche, Ó., 2008b. La Unidad monetaria sudamericana: Elementos para el dise￱o”. 
Accesed  on  10  May  2009  at 
www.obela.org/.../LA+UNIDAD+MONETARIA+SUDAMERICA.doc 
 Woods,  N.,  2010.  Global  Governance  after  the  Financial  Crisis:  A  New 
Multilateralism or the Last Gasp of the Great Powers? Global Policy, 1(1), pp. 51-63. 